2 files changed, 85 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/packages/api/src/agent-manager.ts b/packages/api/src/agent-manager.ts
index 85dd160..9499ce5 100644
--- a/packages/api/src/agent-manager.ts
+++ b/packages/api/src/agent-manager.ts
@@ -575,7 +575,13 @@ export class AgentManager {
 					});
 				}
 				toolEntries.push({ name: "todo", tool: createTaskListTool(tabAgent.taskList) });
-				if (permSummon) {
+				// The `summon` tool is registered when EITHER the subagent
+				// permission (`perm_summon`) OR the user-agent permission
+				// (`perm_user_agent`) is granted — the two are independent.
+				// `perm_summon` enables ordinary subagent spawning; granting
+				// only `perm_user_agent` exposes summon in user-agent-only mode
+				// (spawns top-level user agents exclusively).
+				if (permSummon || permUserAgent) {
 					// Capture parent's allowed tool names for child permission enforcement
 					const parentAllowedTools = new Set(toolEntries.map((e) => e.name));
 					const allAgentDefs = loadAgents(workingDirectory);
@@ -609,19 +615,25 @@ export class AgentManager {
 							availableUserAgents,
 							agentDirPaths,
 							permUserAgent,
+							permSummon,
 						),
 					});
-					toolEntries.push({
-						name: "retrieve",
-						tool: createRetrieveTool({
-							getResult: (id) =>
-								tabAgent.shellStore.has(id)
-									? tabAgent.shellStore.getResult(id)
-									: tabAgent.transcriptStore.has(id)
-										? tabAgent.transcriptStore.getResult(id)
-										: this.getChildResult(id),
-						}),
-					});
+					// `retrieve` collects subagent results. User agents are
+					// fire-and-forget, so it is bundled with the subagent
+					// permission only — a user-agent-only grant doesn't get it.
+					if (permSummon) {
+						toolEntries.push({
+							name: "retrieve",
+							tool: createRetrieveTool({
+								getResult: (id) =>
+									tabAgent.shellStore.has(id)
+										? tabAgent.shellStore.getResult(id)
+										: tabAgent.transcriptStore.has(id)
+											? tabAgent.transcriptStore.getResult(id)
+											: this.getChildResult(id),
+							}),
+						});
+					}
 				}
 				if (permSendToTab || permReadTab) {
 					const tabCommAllowed = new Set<string>();
diff --git a/packages/api/tests/agent-manager.test.ts b/packages/api/tests/agent-manager.test.ts
index 014022a..f3ea207 100644
--- a/packages/api/tests/agent-manager.test.ts
+++ b/packages/api/tests/agent-manager.test.ts
@@ -319,6 +319,22 @@ vi.mock("@dispatch/core", () => ({
 			execute: async () => "mock",
 		};
 	},
+	// Summon parent-path dependencies. The real implementations load agent
+	// definitions from disk; tests only need the summon/retrieve tool entries
+	// to appear, so these return empty projections.
+	loadAgents() {
+		return [];
+	},
+	toAvailableSubagents() {
+		return [];
+	},
+	toAvailableUserAgents() {
+		return [];
+	},
+	getAgentDirPaths() {
+		return [];
+	},
+	GLOBAL_AGENTS_DIR: "/tmp/global-agents",
 	createTab() {},
 	getTab(id: string) {
 		return fakeTabs.get(id) ?? null;
@@ -1441,6 +1457,51 @@ describe("AgentManager", () => {
 		});
 	});
 
+	describe("summon / user_agent permission split", () => {
+		// Drives the real parent-path tool construction in
+		// getOrCreateAgentForTab by toggling perm_summon and perm_user_agent
+		// independently, then inspecting which tools the constructed Agent
+		// received. The summon tool must be registered when EITHER permission
+		// is granted; `retrieve` rides with the subagent permission only
+		// (user agents are fire-and-forget).
+		async function toolsForPerms(tabId: string, perms: Record<string, string>): Promise<string[]> {
+			for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(perms)) setFakeSetting(k, v);
+			const manager = new AgentManager();
+			await manager.processMessage(tabId, "go");
+			return constructedAgents.at(-1)?.toolNames ?? [];
+		}
+
+		it("grants summon + retrieve when only perm_summon is allowed", async () => {
+			const tools = await toolsForPerms("tab-summon-only", { perm_summon: "allow" });
+			expect(tools).toContain("summon");
+			expect(tools).toContain("retrieve");
+		});
+
+		it("grants summon WITHOUT retrieve when only perm_user_agent is allowed", async () => {
+			// Regression: granting only the user-agent permission used to leave
+			// the agent unable to summon user agents because the whole summon
+			// tool was gated behind perm_summon.
+			const tools = await toolsForPerms("tab-user-agent-only", { perm_user_agent: "allow" });
+			expect(tools).toContain("summon");
+			expect(tools).not.toContain("retrieve");
+		});
+
+		it("grants summon + retrieve when both permissions are allowed", async () => {
+			const tools = await toolsForPerms("tab-summon-both", {
+				perm_summon: "allow",
+				perm_user_agent: "allow",
+			});
+			expect(tools).toContain("summon");
+			expect(tools).toContain("retrieve");
+		});
+
+		it("grants neither summon nor retrieve when both permissions are off", async () => {
+			const tools = await toolsForPerms("tab-summon-neither", {});
+			expect(tools).not.toContain("summon");
+			expect(tools).not.toContain("retrieve");
+		});
+	});
+
 	// ─── Usage side-channel persistence ──────────────────────────────
 	//
 	// `usage` AgentEvents (one per LLM round-trip) are persisted as invisible