fix(review-2.6): restrict Vite access to loopback and Tailscale

2 files changed, 300 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/scripts/network-policy.test.ts b/scripts/network-policy.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af7d870
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/network-policy.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  buildAllowedHosts,
+  checkDevRequest,
+  checkHost,
+  isAllowedLocalAddress,
+  normalizeHost,
+  normalizeHostHeader,
+  tailscaleSelf,
+} from "./network-policy";
+
+const tailscaleStatusJson = `{"Self":{"HostName":"laptop",
+  "DNSName":"PII_REDACTED_TAILSCALE_HOST_01.",
+  "TailscaleIPs":["PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01","PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01"]}}`;
+const allowedHosts = buildAllowedHosts({ tailscaleStatusJson, env: {} });
+const allowedAddresses = new Set(["127.0.0.1", "::1", ...tailscaleSelf(tailscaleStatusJson).ips]);
+const policy = { allowedHosts, allowedAddresses };
+const request = (localAddress = "::1", host: string | undefined = "localhost", origin?: string) =>
+  checkDevRequest({ localAddress, host, origin }, policy);
+
+describe("backend-compatible hosts", () => {
+  it.each([
+    ["LOCALHOST.:34204", "localhost"],
+    ["127.0.0.1:34204", "127.0.0.1"],
+    ["[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]:34204", "::1"],
+    ["PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01", "PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01"],
+    ["PII_REDACTED_TAILSCALE_HOST_01.:34204", "PII_REDACTED_TAILSCALE_HOST_01"],
+    ["PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01:34204", "PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01"],
+    ["[PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01]:34204", "PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01"],
+  ])("normalizes and allows %s", (raw, expected) => {
+    expect(normalizeHost(raw)).toBe(expected);
+    expect(checkHost(raw, allowedHosts)).toBe("ok");
+  });
+
+  it.each(
+    (
+      "evil.com|PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01.evil.com|PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01.nip.io|laptop|localhost.evil.com|" +
+      "sub.localhost|127.0.0.2|100.1.2.3|172.17.0.1|[email protected]|localhost/path|" +
+      "localhost:bad|localhost:65536|[::1]suffix|localhost\n|localhost..|%6cocalhost|"
+    ).split("|"),
+  )("rejects %j even where Vite would allow it", (host) => {
+    expect(checkHost(host, allowedHosts)).toMatchObject({ status: 421 });
+  });
+
+  const missingStatuses = [undefined, "invalid", "null", "[]", "{}", '{"Self":null}'];
+  it.each(missingStatuses)("fails closed for status %j, retains env overrides", (json) => {
+    const input = {
+      ...(json !== undefined ? { tailscaleStatusJson: json } : {}),
+      env: {
+        DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS: " EXTRA.example.:8080, https://evil.com",
+        DISPATCH_TAILSCALE_NAME: "PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01",
+      },
+    };
+    const expected = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1,extra.example,PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01".split(",");
+    expect([...buildAllowedHosts(input)]).toEqual(expected);
+    expect(tailscaleSelf(json)).toEqual({ ips: [] });
+  });
+
+  it("keeps auto-detection when env hosts are supplied, without trusting OS hostname", () => {
+    const hosts = buildAllowedHosts({
+      tailscaleStatusJson,
+      env: { DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "extra.example" },
+    });
+    expect(hosts.has("PII_REDACTED_TAILSCALE_HOST_01")).toBe(true);
+    expect(hosts.has("extra.example")).toBe(true);
+    expect(hosts.has("laptop")).toBe(false);
+    expect(tailscaleSelf(tailscaleStatusJson).hostName).toBe("laptop");
+    expect(
+      tailscaleSelf('{"Self":{"TailscaleIPs":[null,"evil.com","PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01"]}}').ips,
+    ).toEqual(["PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01"]);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["LOCALHOST.:34204", "localhost:34204"],
+    ["[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]:34204", "[::1]:34204"],
+    ["[::1]", "[::1]"],
+    ["PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01.", "PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01"],
+  ])("preserves valid authorities for Vite: %s", (raw, expected) => {
+    expect(normalizeHostHeader(raw)).toBe(expected);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("destination interfaces (not remote peer addresses)", () => {
+  it.each(
+    (
+      "127.0.0.1|::1|0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1|::ffff:127.0.0.1|::ffff:7f00:1|" +
+      "PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01|::ffff:PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01|PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01"
+    ).split("|"),
+  )("allows local address %s", (address) => {
+    expect(isAllowedLocalAddress(address, allowedAddresses)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    undefined,
+    ..."|172.17.0.1|::ffff:172.17.0.1|192.168.1.2|100.1.2.3|0.0.0.0|::|127.0.0.2".split("|"),
+  ])("rejects non-selected interface %j", (address) => {
+    expect(isAllowedLocalAddress(address, allowedAddresses)).toBe(false);
+    // undefined must not use the helper's default loopback address.
+    expect(
+      checkDevRequest({ localAddress: address, host: "localhost", origin: undefined }, policy),
+    ).toMatchObject({ status: 403 });
+  });
+
+  it("does not treat an env host extra as an allowed interface", () => {
+    const hosts = buildAllowedHosts({ env: { DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "172.17.0.1" } });
+    expect(
+      checkDevRequest(
+        { localAddress: "172.17.0.1", host: "172.17.0.1", origin: undefined },
+        { allowedHosts: hosts, allowedAddresses },
+      ),
+    ).toMatchObject({ status: 403 });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("shared HTTP / HMR request decision", () => {
+  it.each([
+    undefined,
+    "http://PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01.:34204",
+    "https://[PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01]:443",
+  ])("allows trusted or absent Origin %j", (origin) => {
+    expect(request("::ffff:PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01", "PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01", origin)).toBe("ok");
+  });
+  const badOrigins =
+    "null|file://localhost|https://evil.com|http://localhost/|http://user@localhost";
+  it.each(badOrigins.split("|"))("rejects Origin %j", (origin) => {
+    expect(request("::1", "localhost", origin)).toMatchObject({ status: 403 });
+  });
+  it("requires Host and checks it before Origin", () => {
+    for (const host of [undefined, "evil.com"]) {
+      expect(
+        checkDevRequest({ localAddress: "127.0.0.1", host, origin: "null" }, policy),
+      ).toMatchObject({ status: 421 });
+    }
+  });
+});
diff --git a/scripts/network-policy.ts b/scripts/network-policy.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bb122c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/network-policy.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/** Host/Origin semantics mirrored from backend packages/network-policy (review step 2.4).
+ * Keep in sync there; no I/O or ambient environment reads in this module.
+ */
+export interface NetworkPolicyEnv {
+  readonly DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS?: string;
+  readonly DISPATCH_TAILSCALE_NAME?: string;
+}
+
+export type PolicyDecision<Status extends number> = "ok" | { status: Status; reason: string };
+type HeaderValue = string | null | undefined;
+
+function ipAddress(raw: string): string {
+  if (/^(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/.test(raw)) {
+    return raw.split(".").every((part) => Number(part) <= 255 && String(Number(part)) === part)
+      ? raw
+      : "";
+  }
+  if (!raw.includes(":") || /[^\da-f:.]/i.test(raw)) return "";
+  try {
+    return new URL(`http://[${raw}]`).hostname.slice(1, -1);
+  } catch {
+    return "";
+  }
+}
+
+/** Invalid authorities normalize to "" (fail closed). Bare IPv6 is also accepted. */
+export function normalizeHost(raw: string): string {
+  const host = raw.toLowerCase();
+  if (host.includes(":") && !host.startsWith("[") && host.split(":").length > 2) {
+    return ipAddress(host);
+  }
+  const match = /^(?:\[([\da-f:.]+)\]|([^\s:/\\@?#[\],%]+))(?::(\d+))?$/.exec(host);
+  if (!match || match[0] !== host || (match[3] !== undefined && Number(match[3]) > 65535)) {
+    return "";
+  }
+  if (match[1]) return match[1].includes(":") ? ipAddress(match[1]) : "";
+  const name = (match[2] ?? "").replace(/\.$/, "");
+  return name.length <= 253 &&
+    name.split(".").every((label) => /^[a-z\d](?:[a-z\d-]{0,61}[a-z\d])?$/.test(label))
+    ? name
+    : "";
+}
+
+/** OS HostName is deliberately not trusted; the shell may add it after verifying DNS. */
+export function buildAllowedHosts(input: {
+  tailscaleStatusJson?: string;
+  env: NetworkPolicyEnv;
+}): ReadonlySet<string> {
+  const allowed = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"]);
+  const add = (raw: string) => {
+    const normalized = normalizeHost(raw);
+    if (normalized) allowed.add(normalized);
+  };
+  try {
+    const status: unknown = JSON.parse(input.tailscaleStatusJson ?? "null");
+    if (status && typeof status === "object" && "Self" in status) {
+      const self = status.Self;
+      if (self && typeof self === "object") {
+        if ("DNSName" in self && typeof self.DNSName === "string") {
+          const name = normalizeHost(self.DNSName);
+          if (name) {
+            add(name);
+            add(name.split(".")[0] ?? "");
+          }
+        }
+        if ("TailscaleIPs" in self && Array.isArray(self.TailscaleIPs)) {
+          for (const ip of self.TailscaleIPs) {
+            if (typeof ip === "string" && ipAddress(ip)) add(ip);
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // Missing/malformed status must leave the loopback and explicit env policy intact.
+  }
+  for (const host of (input.env.DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS ?? "").split(",")) add(host.trim());
+  if (input.env.DISPATCH_TAILSCALE_NAME) add(input.env.DISPATCH_TAILSCALE_NAME.trim());
+  return allowed;
+}
+
+export function checkHost(
+  hostHeader: HeaderValue,
+  allowed: ReadonlySet<string>,
+): PolicyDecision<421> {
+  const host = hostHeader == null ? "" : normalizeHost(hostHeader);
+  return host && allowed.has(host) ? "ok" : { status: 421, reason: "Host is not allowed" };
+}
+
+export function checkOrigin(
+  originHeader: HeaderValue,
+  allowed: ReadonlySet<string>,
+): PolicyDecision<403> {
+  if (originHeader == null) return "ok";
+  const match = /^https?:\/\/([^/\\?#\s]+)$/i.exec(originHeader);
+  if (match?.[1] && match[0] === originHeader && checkHost(match[1], allowed) === "ok") {
+    try {
+      new URL(originHeader);
+      return "ok";
+    } catch {
+      // Reject malformed URL authorities even if they resemble an allowed hostname.
+    }
+  }
+  return { status: 403, reason: "Origin is not allowed" };
+}
+
+/** Canonical authority for Vite's narrower parser; preserve ports and IPv6 brackets. */
+export function normalizeHostHeader(raw: string): string {
+  const host = normalizeHost(raw);
+  const port = /^(?:\[[^\]]+\]|[^:]+)(:\d+)$/.exec(raw)?.[1] ?? "";
+  return `${host.includes(":") ? `[${host}]` : host}${port}`;
+}
+
+/** Only the destination interface matters, NOT the remote peer's IP. */
+export function isAllowedLocalAddress(
+  address: string | undefined,
+  allowedAddresses: ReadonlySet<string>,
+): boolean {
+  if (!address) return false;
+  // Dual-stack Node listeners report IPv4 destinations as ::ffff:a.b.c.d (or hex).
+  let normalized = normalizeHost(address);
+  if (normalized.startsWith("::ffff:")) {
+    const words = normalized.slice(7).split(":");
+    if (words.length === 2) {
+      const value =
+        Number.parseInt(words[0] ?? "", 16) * 65536 + Number.parseInt(words[1] ?? "", 16);
+      normalized = [value >>> 24, (value >>> 16) & 255, (value >>> 8) & 255, value & 255].join(".");
+    }
+  }
+  return allowedAddresses.has(normalized);
+}
+
+/** Extract only actual IPs; neither env host extras nor a whole Tailscale subnet is trusted. */
+export function tailscaleSelf(json: string | undefined): { ips: string[]; hostName?: string } {
+  try {
+    const self = JSON.parse(json ?? "null")?.Self;
+    const ips = Array.isArray(self?.TailscaleIPs)
+      ? self.TailscaleIPs.filter(
+          (ip: unknown): ip is string => typeof ip === "string" && !!ipAddress(ip),
+        )
+      : [];
+    return {
+      ips: ips.map((ip: string) => ipAddress(ip)),
+      ...(typeof self?.HostName === "string" ? { hostName: self.HostName } : {}),
+    };
+  } catch {
+    return { ips: [] };
+  }
+}
+
+export interface DevNetworkPolicy {
+  readonly allowedHosts: ReadonlySet<string>;
+  readonly allowedAddresses: ReadonlySet<string>;
+}
+
+/** Shared HTTP and HMR guard. Host precedes Origin, matching the backend. */
+export function checkDevRequest(
+  input: { localAddress: string | undefined; host: string | undefined; origin: string | undefined },
+  policy: DevNetworkPolicy,
+): PolicyDecision<403 | 421> {
+  if (!isAllowedLocalAddress(input.localAddress, policy.allowedAddresses)) {
+    return { status: 403, reason: "Local interface is not allowed" };
+  }
+  const host = checkHost(input.host, policy.allowedHosts);
+  return host === "ok" ? checkOrigin(input.origin, policy.allowedHosts) : host;
+}