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-rw-r--r--scripts/network-policy.test.ts135
-rw-r--r--scripts/network-policy.ts165
2 files changed, 300 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/network-policy.test.ts b/scripts/network-policy.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af7d870
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/network-policy.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+ buildAllowedHosts,
+ checkDevRequest,
+ checkHost,
+ isAllowedLocalAddress,
+ normalizeHost,
+ normalizeHostHeader,
+ tailscaleSelf,
+} from "./network-policy";
+
+const tailscaleStatusJson = `{"Self":{"HostName":"laptop",
+ "DNSName":"PII_REDACTED_TAILSCALE_HOST_01.",
+ "TailscaleIPs":["PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01","PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01"]}}`;
+const allowedHosts = buildAllowedHosts({ tailscaleStatusJson, env: {} });
+const allowedAddresses = new Set(["127.0.0.1", "::1", ...tailscaleSelf(tailscaleStatusJson).ips]);
+const policy = { allowedHosts, allowedAddresses };
+const request = (localAddress = "::1", host: string | undefined = "localhost", origin?: string) =>
+ checkDevRequest({ localAddress, host, origin }, policy);
+
+describe("backend-compatible hosts", () => {
+ it.each([
+ ["LOCALHOST.:34204", "localhost"],
+ ["127.0.0.1:34204", "127.0.0.1"],
+ ["[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]:34204", "::1"],
+ ["PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01", "PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01"],
+ ["PII_REDACTED_TAILSCALE_HOST_01.:34204", "PII_REDACTED_TAILSCALE_HOST_01"],
+ ["PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01:34204", "PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01"],
+ ["[PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01]:34204", "PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01"],
+ ])("normalizes and allows %s", (raw, expected) => {
+ expect(normalizeHost(raw)).toBe(expected);
+ expect(checkHost(raw, allowedHosts)).toBe("ok");
+ });
+
+ it.each(
+ (
+ "evil.com|PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01.evil.com|PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01.nip.io|laptop|localhost.evil.com|" +
+ "sub.localhost|127.0.0.2|100.1.2.3|172.17.0.1|[email protected]|localhost/path|" +
+ "localhost:bad|localhost:65536|[::1]suffix|localhost\n|localhost..|%6cocalhost|"
+ ).split("|"),
+ )("rejects %j even where Vite would allow it", (host) => {
+ expect(checkHost(host, allowedHosts)).toMatchObject({ status: 421 });
+ });
+
+ const missingStatuses = [undefined, "invalid", "null", "[]", "{}", '{"Self":null}'];
+ it.each(missingStatuses)("fails closed for status %j, retains env overrides", (json) => {
+ const input = {
+ ...(json !== undefined ? { tailscaleStatusJson: json } : {}),
+ env: {
+ DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS: " EXTRA.example.:8080, https://evil.com",
+ DISPATCH_TAILSCALE_NAME: "PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01",
+ },
+ };
+ const expected = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1,extra.example,PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01".split(",");
+ expect([...buildAllowedHosts(input)]).toEqual(expected);
+ expect(tailscaleSelf(json)).toEqual({ ips: [] });
+ });
+
+ it("keeps auto-detection when env hosts are supplied, without trusting OS hostname", () => {
+ const hosts = buildAllowedHosts({
+ tailscaleStatusJson,
+ env: { DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "extra.example" },
+ });
+ expect(hosts.has("PII_REDACTED_TAILSCALE_HOST_01")).toBe(true);
+ expect(hosts.has("extra.example")).toBe(true);
+ expect(hosts.has("laptop")).toBe(false);
+ expect(tailscaleSelf(tailscaleStatusJson).hostName).toBe("laptop");
+ expect(
+ tailscaleSelf('{"Self":{"TailscaleIPs":[null,"evil.com","PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01"]}}').ips,
+ ).toEqual(["PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01"]);
+ });
+
+ it.each([
+ ["LOCALHOST.:34204", "localhost:34204"],
+ ["[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]:34204", "[::1]:34204"],
+ ["[::1]", "[::1]"],
+ ["PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01.", "PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01"],
+ ])("preserves valid authorities for Vite: %s", (raw, expected) => {
+ expect(normalizeHostHeader(raw)).toBe(expected);
+ });
+});
+
+describe("destination interfaces (not remote peer addresses)", () => {
+ it.each(
+ (
+ "127.0.0.1|::1|0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1|::ffff:127.0.0.1|::ffff:7f00:1|" +
+ "PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01|::ffff:PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01|PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01"
+ ).split("|"),
+ )("allows local address %s", (address) => {
+ expect(isAllowedLocalAddress(address, allowedAddresses)).toBe(true);
+ });
+
+ it.each([
+ undefined,
+ ..."|172.17.0.1|::ffff:172.17.0.1|192.168.1.2|100.1.2.3|0.0.0.0|::|127.0.0.2".split("|"),
+ ])("rejects non-selected interface %j", (address) => {
+ expect(isAllowedLocalAddress(address, allowedAddresses)).toBe(false);
+ // undefined must not use the helper's default loopback address.
+ expect(
+ checkDevRequest({ localAddress: address, host: "localhost", origin: undefined }, policy),
+ ).toMatchObject({ status: 403 });
+ });
+
+ it("does not treat an env host extra as an allowed interface", () => {
+ const hosts = buildAllowedHosts({ env: { DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "172.17.0.1" } });
+ expect(
+ checkDevRequest(
+ { localAddress: "172.17.0.1", host: "172.17.0.1", origin: undefined },
+ { allowedHosts: hosts, allowedAddresses },
+ ),
+ ).toMatchObject({ status: 403 });
+ });
+});
+
+describe("shared HTTP / HMR request decision", () => {
+ it.each([
+ undefined,
+ "http://PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01.:34204",
+ "https://[PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV6_01]:443",
+ ])("allows trusted or absent Origin %j", (origin) => {
+ expect(request("::ffff:PII_REDACTED_DEV_IPV4_01", "PII_REDACTED_DEVICE_01", origin)).toBe("ok");
+ });
+ const badOrigins =
+ "null|file://localhost|https://evil.com|http://localhost/|http://user@localhost";
+ it.each(badOrigins.split("|"))("rejects Origin %j", (origin) => {
+ expect(request("::1", "localhost", origin)).toMatchObject({ status: 403 });
+ });
+ it("requires Host and checks it before Origin", () => {
+ for (const host of [undefined, "evil.com"]) {
+ expect(
+ checkDevRequest({ localAddress: "127.0.0.1", host, origin: "null" }, policy),
+ ).toMatchObject({ status: 421 });
+ }
+ });
+});
diff --git a/scripts/network-policy.ts b/scripts/network-policy.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bb122c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/network-policy.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/** Host/Origin semantics mirrored from backend packages/network-policy (review step 2.4).
+ * Keep in sync there; no I/O or ambient environment reads in this module.
+ */
+export interface NetworkPolicyEnv {
+ readonly DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS?: string;
+ readonly DISPATCH_TAILSCALE_NAME?: string;
+}
+
+export type PolicyDecision<Status extends number> = "ok" | { status: Status; reason: string };
+type HeaderValue = string | null | undefined;
+
+function ipAddress(raw: string): string {
+ if (/^(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/.test(raw)) {
+ return raw.split(".").every((part) => Number(part) <= 255 && String(Number(part)) === part)
+ ? raw
+ : "";
+ }
+ if (!raw.includes(":") || /[^\da-f:.]/i.test(raw)) return "";
+ try {
+ return new URL(`http://[${raw}]`).hostname.slice(1, -1);
+ } catch {
+ return "";
+ }
+}
+
+/** Invalid authorities normalize to "" (fail closed). Bare IPv6 is also accepted. */
+export function normalizeHost(raw: string): string {
+ const host = raw.toLowerCase();
+ if (host.includes(":") && !host.startsWith("[") && host.split(":").length > 2) {
+ return ipAddress(host);
+ }
+ const match = /^(?:\[([\da-f:.]+)\]|([^\s:/\\@?#[\],%]+))(?::(\d+))?$/.exec(host);
+ if (!match || match[0] !== host || (match[3] !== undefined && Number(match[3]) > 65535)) {
+ return "";
+ }
+ if (match[1]) return match[1].includes(":") ? ipAddress(match[1]) : "";
+ const name = (match[2] ?? "").replace(/\.$/, "");
+ return name.length <= 253 &&
+ name.split(".").every((label) => /^[a-z\d](?:[a-z\d-]{0,61}[a-z\d])?$/.test(label))
+ ? name
+ : "";
+}
+
+/** OS HostName is deliberately not trusted; the shell may add it after verifying DNS. */
+export function buildAllowedHosts(input: {
+ tailscaleStatusJson?: string;
+ env: NetworkPolicyEnv;
+}): ReadonlySet<string> {
+ const allowed = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"]);
+ const add = (raw: string) => {
+ const normalized = normalizeHost(raw);
+ if (normalized) allowed.add(normalized);
+ };
+ try {
+ const status: unknown = JSON.parse(input.tailscaleStatusJson ?? "null");
+ if (status && typeof status === "object" && "Self" in status) {
+ const self = status.Self;
+ if (self && typeof self === "object") {
+ if ("DNSName" in self && typeof self.DNSName === "string") {
+ const name = normalizeHost(self.DNSName);
+ if (name) {
+ add(name);
+ add(name.split(".")[0] ?? "");
+ }
+ }
+ if ("TailscaleIPs" in self && Array.isArray(self.TailscaleIPs)) {
+ for (const ip of self.TailscaleIPs) {
+ if (typeof ip === "string" && ipAddress(ip)) add(ip);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } catch {
+ // Missing/malformed status must leave the loopback and explicit env policy intact.
+ }
+ for (const host of (input.env.DISPATCH_ALLOWED_HOSTS ?? "").split(",")) add(host.trim());
+ if (input.env.DISPATCH_TAILSCALE_NAME) add(input.env.DISPATCH_TAILSCALE_NAME.trim());
+ return allowed;
+}
+
+export function checkHost(
+ hostHeader: HeaderValue,
+ allowed: ReadonlySet<string>,
+): PolicyDecision<421> {
+ const host = hostHeader == null ? "" : normalizeHost(hostHeader);
+ return host && allowed.has(host) ? "ok" : { status: 421, reason: "Host is not allowed" };
+}
+
+export function checkOrigin(
+ originHeader: HeaderValue,
+ allowed: ReadonlySet<string>,
+): PolicyDecision<403> {
+ if (originHeader == null) return "ok";
+ const match = /^https?:\/\/([^/\\?#\s]+)$/i.exec(originHeader);
+ if (match?.[1] && match[0] === originHeader && checkHost(match[1], allowed) === "ok") {
+ try {
+ new URL(originHeader);
+ return "ok";
+ } catch {
+ // Reject malformed URL authorities even if they resemble an allowed hostname.
+ }
+ }
+ return { status: 403, reason: "Origin is not allowed" };
+}
+
+/** Canonical authority for Vite's narrower parser; preserve ports and IPv6 brackets. */
+export function normalizeHostHeader(raw: string): string {
+ const host = normalizeHost(raw);
+ const port = /^(?:\[[^\]]+\]|[^:]+)(:\d+)$/.exec(raw)?.[1] ?? "";
+ return `${host.includes(":") ? `[${host}]` : host}${port}`;
+}
+
+/** Only the destination interface matters, NOT the remote peer's IP. */
+export function isAllowedLocalAddress(
+ address: string | undefined,
+ allowedAddresses: ReadonlySet<string>,
+): boolean {
+ if (!address) return false;
+ // Dual-stack Node listeners report IPv4 destinations as ::ffff:a.b.c.d (or hex).
+ let normalized = normalizeHost(address);
+ if (normalized.startsWith("::ffff:")) {
+ const words = normalized.slice(7).split(":");
+ if (words.length === 2) {
+ const value =
+ Number.parseInt(words[0] ?? "", 16) * 65536 + Number.parseInt(words[1] ?? "", 16);
+ normalized = [value >>> 24, (value >>> 16) & 255, (value >>> 8) & 255, value & 255].join(".");
+ }
+ }
+ return allowedAddresses.has(normalized);
+}
+
+/** Extract only actual IPs; neither env host extras nor a whole Tailscale subnet is trusted. */
+export function tailscaleSelf(json: string | undefined): { ips: string[]; hostName?: string } {
+ try {
+ const self = JSON.parse(json ?? "null")?.Self;
+ const ips = Array.isArray(self?.TailscaleIPs)
+ ? self.TailscaleIPs.filter(
+ (ip: unknown): ip is string => typeof ip === "string" && !!ipAddress(ip),
+ )
+ : [];
+ return {
+ ips: ips.map((ip: string) => ipAddress(ip)),
+ ...(typeof self?.HostName === "string" ? { hostName: self.HostName } : {}),
+ };
+ } catch {
+ return { ips: [] };
+ }
+}
+
+export interface DevNetworkPolicy {
+ readonly allowedHosts: ReadonlySet<string>;
+ readonly allowedAddresses: ReadonlySet<string>;
+}
+
+/** Shared HTTP and HMR guard. Host precedes Origin, matching the backend. */
+export function checkDevRequest(
+ input: { localAddress: string | undefined; host: string | undefined; origin: string | undefined },
+ policy: DevNetworkPolicy,
+): PolicyDecision<403 | 421> {
+ if (!isAllowedLocalAddress(input.localAddress, policy.allowedAddresses)) {
+ return { status: 403, reason: "Local interface is not allowed" };
+ }
+ const host = checkHost(input.host, policy.allowedHosts);
+ return host === "ok" ? checkOrigin(input.origin, policy.allowedHosts) : host;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2026-10-26 00:54:13 +0000